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Abstract
This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors)
are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which
agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary
rewards. Intrinsic motivation could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses
only monetary incentives.
We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well
designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that
such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also
prove that when doctors are risk-averse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational
capital.
Keywords: contracts, moral hazard, intrinsic motivation, crowding effects, motivational capital.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this work is to investigate the roles played by the intrinsic motivation of doctors working in
public health systems and by crowding effects, which can either undermine or enhance these inner motiva-
tions. Should health care organisations invest in motivating doctors? How should organisations’ managers
design incentive schemes so that they can benefit from what Akerlof and Kranton [1] call motivational
capital? Could intrinsic motivation be the key to avoiding opportunistic behaviour?
People who work in the provision of collective goods are usually intrinsically motivated agents who
get satisfaction from the very act of doing their work. There are motives such as altruism, reciprocity,
intrinsic pleasure in helping others and ethical commitments, that induce people to help others more than
would an own-material-maximizing individual [7]. Teachers, doctors, firefighters, policemen and social
workers are good examples of such intrinsically motivated workers [2, 4, 20]. We use the term “intrinsic
motivation” to refer to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable [10, 11]. In health
care, intrinsic motivation refers to doctors’ willingness to exert effort performing in medical activities that
are of non-material interest like research, teaching, further education, health prevention activities or clinical
management.
A new branch of contract theory investigates optimal contracts and incentives when agents are intrin-
sically motivated and when incentives beyond the money work [13, 14, 24, 28]. Dewatripont, Jewitt and
Tirole [14] explore the effects of implicit incentives in the form of career concerns. Murdock [24] shows that
in presence of implicit contracts, the firm can commit to implement some financially non-profitable projects
with positive intrinsic value for the agent because doing that, agents will respond putting high effort to
generate more projects and increasing the expected returns of the firm.
Another body of the literature analyzes the effects of having motivated agents in public organisations
or in private organisations that serve collective goods [4, 16, 17, 27]. Wilson [29] explains how in the
collective goods provision agencies, incentives are supplemented with a sense of mission based on a shared
organizational culture. In Ghatak and Mueller [20] organisations can reduce incentive payments when they
contract intrinsically motivated agents. Thus, an organisation that adopts the non-for-profit status will
attract motivated workers and will benefit from paying agents lower efficiency wages. Dewatripont, Jewitt
and Tirole [15] show that specialization and profesionalization of organisations raises the incentives of agents
and create a sense of mission. They point out that “this paradigm can be fruitfully expanded, for example
to a dynamic perspective where effort choices are repeated and where the evolution of mission design can be
analysed (p. 216)”.
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The above literature incorporates intrinsic motivation and the importance of the non-monetary incentives
in principal-agent models. However, all these works have neglected the well established fact that incentives
affect intrinsic motivation. Psychologists [8, 9, 10, 12], and behavioural economists [2, 5, 18, 19] argue that
under some specific conditions incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation of agents. The crowding-out effect
is one of the most important anomalies in economics, and it acts in a manner opposite to the fundamental
economic ‘law’ that raising monetary incentives increases supply [2, 3, 5, 7, 19, 22]. Bowles and Polanía-
Reyes [7] classify the mechanisms accounting for crowding out. Our framework deals with three of these
mechanisms: the informative value of incentives about principal’s intentions or type, the compromise of
agents’ self determination or control aversion, and the agents’ preferences updating process.
However crowding-in also can occur [7, 11]. In sixteen out of the fifty experiments surveyed in Bowles
and Polanía-Reyes [7] they found evidence of crowding-in showing that well designed fines, subsidies, and
the like, make incentives and intrinsic motivation complements rather than substitutes.
This work investigates the principal-agent relationship between managers and doctors [23], where the
divergence in objectives between the principal’s performance measures and the physicians’ mission is a
source of conflict. It is assumed that principals in health care are primarily focused on health benefits.
They focus heavily upon improving certain health performance measures that are easily observable by
the electorate: for instance reducing the amount of time spent on waiting lists, increasing the number of
operations conducted for common pathologies, increasing the infrastructure, buying new technology assets,
reducing costs and saving resources, and enlarging the range of services supplied. In contrast, physicians’
goals are focused toward patients, a subset of all tax-payers, and also they have other interests in clinical
and medical research, teaching and further education that taken together form what is called the doctors’
“mission”. One key fact of our approach is that incentives may make the action of providing health a less
convincing signal of a doctors’ intrinsic motivation resulting in observers interpreting some generous acts as
merely self-interested. This may crowd out doctors intrinsic motivation and they could shift from an ethical
to a payoff maximizing frame [3, 7].
The contribution of our approach is threefold: first, following Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [14]
research program, we present a dynamical principal-agent model with intrinsically motivated agents and
repeated effort and incentives choices to analyze the evolution of optimal contracts; second, we incorporate
crowding effects in this dynamic model; and third, the proposed dynamical setting allows us to endogeneize
changes in doctors’ preferences in response to the principal actions and therefore to evaluate how optimal
contracts evolve and affect the outcomes of the game.
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In the model, health managers have two options to motivate doctors: motivational investments and
monetary incentives. We use the term motivational investments to refer to the resources devoted to well de-
signed mechanisms, beyond the monetary incentives, oriented towards maintaining, recovering or enhancing
doctors’ intrinsic motivation through a crowding-in effect. However, the use of pure monetary incentives
may discourage doctors through a crowding-out effect, leading them to behave as payoff maximisers.
We discuss the conditions under which spending resources on motivational capital is optimal for the
health organisation’s manager. Our results show that investing in motivational capital will be more efficient
than monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are risk-averse, it is more
profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 shows the results and section
4 summarizes the work with some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There are two players in the game: a doctor A (agent) and a health manager P (principal)1. We assume
that A is intrinsically motivated. We also restrict the analysis to linear contracts.
The game is played for a finite number of periods t = 0, 1, ..., T, .... There is a health performance
measure qt ∈ R −the number of QALYs for instance− that P wants to maximise. For all t let Rt(qt) be a
function Rt : R −→ R+ which assigns a monetary value to every qt2.
Performance qt is a function of doctor’s effort et ∈ {e, e}. Assume that qt ∈ {q, q} in which q > q.
Take q as P’s target for performance level and q as a failure to reach this target performance level. Let
p(qt = q|et) = θi be the conditional probability of high performance given A’s effort choice i = 0, 1 in which 0
indicates low effort e and 1 indicates high effort e. The probability distribution of qt conditioned to et is given
by: p(qt = q|et = e) = θ1; p(qt = q|et = e) = 1 − θ1 and, p(qt = q|et = e) = θ0; p(qt = q|et = e) = 1 − θ0.
We assume that θ1 > θ0, which indicates that qt is an informative signal of et.
We denote the health expected revenue conditional to qt with E[Rt(qt)|θi]; R and R will stand for Rt(q)
and Rt(q), respectively.
Let wt(qt) be the contingent monetary reward offered by P. E[wt(qt)|θi] will then be the expected mon-
etary cost for the health organisation, or P. Let s0 ∈ {0, S} be the total initial investment in motivational
capital. This investment generates a cost stream Ct(s0) that takes the value C0(S) = S or C0(0) = 0 in t = 0
1We use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, is conventional whithin the principal agent literature.
2QALY stands for Quality Adjusted Live Years. For an estimation of the monetary value of a QALY see Pinto-Prades,
Loomes and Brey (2009).
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and gives the depreciation cost Ct(S) = γS for every t > 1 at a constant depreciation rate of γ ∈ [0, 1). We
assume, as in Murdock [24], that by having motivated doctors, P should expect discounted future profits
higher than the current cost of motivational incentives. P’s problem is to maximise the expected profit
function.
E[pit|θi] = E[Rt(qt)− wt(qt)− Ct(s0)|θi]
We represent A’s preferences with the following overall expected utility function.
E[Ut|θi] = E[ut(wt)− ψt(et) + φt
(
wt, s0
)|θi]
The first term on the right hand side of the above expression ut(wt), represents A’s utility from monetary
incentives which “...complement the remuneration provided by the employer of the physician (p. 1)”, as in
De Pouvourville [26]. We assume that A is risk-averse and that this utility function from monetary rewards
satisfies the Inada conditions3.
The middle term ψt(et) is the cost from effort in utility terms that depends positively upon effort:
ψt(e) = 0 and ψt(e) = Ψ. Thus, ψt(et) ∈ {0,Ψ}.
The last term is φt(wt, s0) ∈ [0,Φ], in which φt : R2+ −→ R+ captures A’s intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic
motivation depends negatively upon incentives wt and positively on P’s investment in motivational capital
s0.
The incentives offered by P may affect the intrinsic motivation of A through crowding effects. The
properties of this intrinsic motivation function and of crowding effects are summed up in the following
assumptions:
A1: For any fixed value of wt, w∗ ∈ [0,∞) we have φt(w∗, S)− φt(w∗, 0) > 0.
A2: Intrinsic motivation depends negatively upon incentives:
∂φt(wt, s0)/∂wt < 0.
A3: Crowding in: in the case that P chooses s0 = S, φt increases over time:
dφt (wt, S) /dt > 0
3Inada conditions: dut(wt)/dwt > 0, d2ut(wt)/dw2t < 0, ut(0) = 0, limt→∞
h
dut(wt)/dwt
i
= 0 and lim
t→0
h
dut(wt)/dwt
i
=∞.
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A4: Crowding out: in case of P chooses s0 = 0, φt decreases over time;
dφt (wt, 0) /dt < 0
Assumption A1 shows a fixed crowding effect. Assumption A2 tells that intrinsic motivation is negatively
correlated with incentives (crowding out). Assumption A3 captures a crowding-in effect: when P chooses the
s0 = S, A’s intrinsic motivation will increase period after period. Assumption A4 captures a crowding-out
effect: when P chooses a s0 = 0, A’s intrinsic motivation will diminish period after period.
Physicians may have different degrees of intrinsic motivation at t = 0. The model captures this
heterogeneity with a probability distribution function, F0(φ0) that is defined over the value of the in-
trinsic motivation at t = 0. For any φ∗ ∈ [0,Φ] the distribution function calculates the probability
F0(φ∗) = Prob(φ0 6 φ∗). In the game, P knows F0(φ0). His offer at t = 0 affects A’s intrinsic mo-
tivation through crowding effects. We model crowding effects as time displacements of the distribution
function conditional to s0 ∈ {0, S} and wt (for example, Ft(φt|wt, s0)). Thus, for any φt = φ∗ ∈ [0,Φ], the
conditional distribution calculates the probability Ft(φt|wt, s0) = Prob(φt 6 φ∗).
Figure 1 shows how crowding effects affect the intrinsic motivation probability distribution function. At
t = 0, P knows a given distribution function F0(φ0). His choice of incentives in t = 0 affects agents intrinsic
motivation switching the distribution function at t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
Fig. 1: Stochastic Dominance. The figure shows how crowding effects affect the intrinsic motivation
probability distribution function in response to principal’s choice of incentive policy: motivational invest-
ments s0 = S, or pure monetary incentives s0 = 0. Motivational investments s0 = S cause crowding-in
switching the distribution function to the right period after period: Ft(φ|wt, S) > Ft+1(φ|wt+1, S). Pure
monetary incentives s0 = 0 cause crowding-out switching the distribution function to the left period after
period: Ft(φ|wt, 0) < Ft+1(φ|wt+1, 0). Stochastic dominance ensures that no curve cross each together
As shown in the figure, if P chooses s0 = 0, then the distribution function will shift to the left period
after period. In other words, if incentives are only monetary, then doctors will concentrate around lower
values of intrinsic motivation φt = 0. In contrast, if incentives are motivational s0 = S, then doctors will
concentrate around higher values of intrinsic motivation φt = Φ. In this latter case, the distribution function
shifts period after period to the right in figure 1.
We assume stochastic dominance in distribution function time shifts. This property assumes, as shown
in figure 1, that P’s choices of incentives affect every A intrinsic motivation in the same way. As a result,
stochastic dominance assumes that probability distributions do not intersect on another4.
4For a more formal description of this property, see the mathematical appendix.
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The game is a repeated dynamic recontracting game. In each period of the game both players have to
make new choices: P must offer a new contract after updating his beliefs about A, and A has to choose
a new effort level. The choices made by P affect A’s intrinsic motivation, and changes in A’s motivation
affect the contract and equilibrium payments offered by P in the next period.
Each period of the game consists of three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2. The timing of the
within-period in each t = 0, 1 . . . , T, . . . is:
(0) The principal P knows the distribution of doctors’ intrinsic motivation F0(φ0) at t = 0 or updates
Ft(φt|s0, wt) given wt and s0 at t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . . He then offers a contract to A. This contract consists
of a pair of stochastic contingent payments w0(q0) = {w,w} and the choice to invest or not invest in
motivational capital s0: {w0(q0), s0} at t = 0 and {wt(qt), s0} at t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
(1) A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then she chooses an action et ∈ {e, e} at each
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . . If she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2) Finally, output is realised qt ∈ {q, q}, payment is realised wt(qt) = {w,w} and payoffs pit and Ut are
realised in each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
Figure 2 shows the sequence of these stages in t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
Fig. 2: Timing. The figure describes the stages of the game within each period, differentiating the starting
period of the game t = 0, where no crowding effect has had place, from subsequent periods t = 1, 2, . . .
where P’s actions affects As’ intrinsic motivation through crowding effects
Before solving the game, let us assume that P and A can not sign long term contracts at t = 0. As a
result, they have to agree upon the rewards at every period t. Once P has chosen s0 = S in t = 0 he bears
the depreciation cost Ct(s0) = γS. We also assume that there is no contract renegotiation in the short
term. In this game, the only way to agree upon a contract is to play the repeated game at every period
t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... as a new game.
We can therefore write P’s problem as follows,
Max{wt(qt),s0}E[Rt(qt)− wt(qt)− Ct(s0)|θ1] (1)
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Subject to
E[ut(wt)− ψt(e) + φt
(
wt, s0
)
|θ1)] > E[ut(wt)− ψt(e) + φt
(
wt, s0
)
|θ0)] (ICC) (2)
E[ut(wt)− ψt(e) + φt
(
wt, s0
)
|θ1)] > U (PC) (3)
ut(w) > 0 (LLC) (4)
(2) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) and ensures that the agent will prefer to exert high
effort. (3) is the A’s participation constraint (PC) and ensures that the agent will prefer to participate
and accept the contract. Finally, (4) is a limited liability constraint (LLC) and ensures that the low utility
payment will never fall below zero.
The solution to the above problem for each t is a pair of contingent payments {w,w} associated with q
and q, respectively. Let us show how we calculate the equilibrium of the game.
For notational simplicity we will write ut(w) = u and ut(w) = u. Let h : u(w) 7−→ w be the inverse of
the utility function h(u(w)) = (u(w))−1 = w; then w = h(u) and w = h(u). Finally ∆θ = (θ1 − θ0); and
reservation utility is denoted by U .
We rewrite P’s problem as follows:
Max{wt(qt),s0}θ1
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ1) (R− h(u))− Ct(s0) (5)
Subject to
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u−Ψ + φt > θ0u+ (1− θ0)u+ φt (ICC) (6)
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u−Ψ + φt > U (PC) (7)
u > 0 (LLC) (8)
Letting λ and µ be the non-negative Khun-Tucker multipliers associated respectively to (ICC) and (PC)
constraints. First-order conditions of this problem lead to:
(
1/u′(w)
)
= µ+ λ · (∆θ/θ1) (9)(
1/u′(w)
)
= µ− λ · (∆θ/(1− θ1)) (10)
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The equations (9) and (10) (jointly with (6) and (7)) form a system of four equations with four variables
(w,w, µ, λ). Multiplying (9) by θ1 and (10) by (1−θ1) and adding those two modified equations, we obtain;
µ =
(
θ1/u
′(w)
)
+
(
1− θ1)/u′(w)
)
> 0 (11)
Therefore, µ > 0 and the participation constraint (9) is binding. Using (11) and (9), we also obtain,
λ =
(
(1− θ1) · θ1/∆θ
)
·
((
1/u′(w)
)− (1/u′(w))) > 0 (12)
Therefore, λ > 0 and the incentive compatibility constraint (6) is also binding. Thus, we can immediately
obtain the values of u and u by solving a system with two equations and two unknowns. The result is shown
below:
ut = U − φt (wt, s0) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
ut = U − φt (wt, s0)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ.
Applying the variable change wt(qt) = h(ut(wt)) = (ut(wt))
−1, we have the following payments,
wt = h(ut) =
(
U − φt (wt, s0) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
wt = h(ut) =
(
U − φt (wt, s0)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
.
Thus, at every period of the game, P must offer to A the following expected payments,
wt =
(
U − E[φt|wt, s0] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
(13)
wt =
(
U − E[φt|wt, s0]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
. (14)
We write the Expected Cost function for the health manager at each t as follows,
ECt = (θ1wt + (1− θ1)wt) + Ct(s0)
Let us use the superscript s0 ∈ {0, S} in ECs0t and ws0t to differentiate the expected cost function and
expected payments when P invests in motivational capital s0 = S from the no investment case s0 = 0. We
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then have ECSt and EC0t .
EC0t =
(
θ1w
0
t + (1− θ1)w0t
)
ECSt =
(
θ1w
S
t + (1− θ1)wSt
)
+ ct(S)
As we have said in Section II, doctors’ intrinsic motivation can be considered another productive asset
or capital of the health organization called Motivational Capital. The current net value (CNV mk) of the
return of an investment in motivational capital is:
CNV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
EC0t − ECSt
]
(15)
in which, δt =
(
1/(1 + r)
)t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate. We say that the principal
has incentives to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk > 0 and we say that, there is no incentive to
invest in motivational capital when CNV mk < 0.
3 Results
We solve the principal’s problem under two alternative scenarios: when P chooses s0 = S and when he
chooses s0 = 0. We calculate the solution for each case to show necessary and sufficient conditions for
investing in motivational capital.
3.1 Motivational Incentives: Crowding In
First, we solve the model for the case in which the health manager chooses s0 = S. In this case, A’s spot
utilities and spot payments in each t are:
uSt = U − φt (wt, S) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ; uSt = U − φt (wt, S)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ and
wSt =
(
U − Et[φt|wt, S] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
; wSt =
(
U − Et[φt|wt, S]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
.
We write the expected cost function as
ECSt = θ1w
S
t + (1− θ1)wSt + Ct(S).
We can now calculate the spot expected profit Et[piSt |θ1] for P and the spot expected utility Et[USt |θ1]
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for A.
Et[piSt |θ1] = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECSt ] (16)
Et[USt |θ1] =
(
θ1u
S
t + (1− θ1)uSt
)−Ψ + φt(wt, S) (17)
Finally, we will compute the current value of the sum of spot expected profits (ΠS), the sum of the spot
expected utilities (US) and the current value of the total surplus (TSS) when the action of P is s0 = S.
ΠS =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[piSt |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECSt ]
)
US =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[USt |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
θ1u
S
t + (1− θ1)uSt −Ψ + φt
(
wt, S
))
TSS = US + ΠS (18)
3.2 Motivational Incentives: Crowding Out
The second case is s0 = 0, when P uses pure monetary rewards and causes the crowding out of intrinsic
motivation. In this case, A’s spot utilities and spot payments in each t are:
u0t = U − φt (wt, 0) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ; u0t = U − φt (wt, 0)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ and
w0t = h
(
U − Et[φt|wt, 0] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
; w0t = h
(
U − Et[φt|wt, 0]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
.
We write the expected cost function as
ECF 0t = θ1w
0
t + (1− θ1)w0t
We can now calculate the spot expected profit Et[pi0t |θ1] for P and the spot expected utility Et[U0t |θ1]
for A.
Et[pi0t |θ1] = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− EC0t (19)
Et[U0t |θ1] =
(
θ1u
0
t + (1− θ1)u0t
)−Ψ + φt(wt, 0) (20)
For this case, we also complete the results showing the current value of the sum of spot expected profits
(Π0), the sum of the spot expected utilities (U0), and the current value of the total surplus (TS0) when the
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action of P is s0 = 0.
Π0 =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[pi0t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [EC0t ]
)
U0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
u0t + (1− θ1)u0t + φt
(
wt, 0
)
−Ψ
]
TS0 = U0 + Π0 (21)
3.3 Comparative Statics
Motivational Capital and Optimal Contracts
Our model shows that an intrinsically motivated doctor is willing to work for lower overall pay. When these
savings in rewarding motivated agents are high enough, it can be worthwhile for P to undertake a costly
program to promote doctors’ intrinsic motivation.
This work shows that when monetary and non-monetary incentives are correctly set, health organisations
could benefit from investing in doctors’ intrinsic motivation. Changes in each parameter of the model will
affect the profitability of such an investment on Motivational Capital which will be a key question in P’s
behaviour.
We want to establish a decision rule for P. He will take an action over s0 = {0, S} depending upon
the total present profit that he can extract from each. Our analysis of P’s behaviour then begins with a
comparison of the different values of the contracts that he gets in with each decision. Let T be the number
of periods that the game is going to be played. We then have:
ΠS −Π0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
Et[piSt |θ1]− Et[pi0t |θ1]
]
=
T∑
t=0
δt
[
Et[piSt − pi0t |θ1]
]
Looking at the above expression, the decision rule for P will be to choose s0 = 0 (pure monetary reward
incentives) when ΠS − Π0 < 0 and to choose s0 = S when ΠS − Π0 > 0. After substituting (16) and (19),
and rearranging we get,
ΠS −Π0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1(w0t − wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t − wSt )
]− T∑
t=0
δtCt(S) =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
EC0t − ECSt
]
As we can see, the above expression equals the expression (15), which reflects the current net value of
an investment made by P to generate motivation CNV mk. P will then choose s0 = S in the case that
CNV mk > 0 and will choose s0 = 0 in the case that CNV mk < 0.
13
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We then establish the following result:
Proposition 1. Let T be the number of periods that the game will be played. There always exists a threshold
t∗ such that:
∑t∗
t=0 δ
t
[
θ1(w0t − wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t − wSt )
]
=
∑t∗
t=0 δ
tCt(S)
and for which
i. If t∗ 6 T then CNV mk > 0 and P finds it profitable to invest in motivational capital and choose the
s0 = S strategy.
ii. If t∗ > T then CNV mk < 0 and P finds it profitable to not invest in motivational capital and chooses
the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 3 illustrates the result. The left side shows P’s expected cost functionf for s0 = 0 and s0 = S.
The right side shows the value of the CNV mk as a function of time t. The t∗ threshold determines the
critical point below which the best strategy for P will be to not invest.
Fig. 3: Current Net Value of Motivational Capital. The graph shows together the expected cost
functions ECSt and EC0t , joint with the net current value of motivational capital CNV mk. The motivational
investments profitability threshold t∗ fix the point at which the CNV mk becomes positive and therefore
investing in motivational capital s0 = S is the best choice for P
CNV mk depends on P’s time preference, which is captured in the model by the parameter δ. Lower
values indicate that the health manager puts more weight on the present. Impatience therefore makes
s0 = S less attractive.
Remark. A lower value of δ means that the health manager is more focused on the short term. This
implies that t∗ will be larger, consequently making any investment of resources in motivational capital (i.e.,
implementing the s0 = S strategy) less attractive to him.
This simple observation leads to an important discussion: the need for politically independent managerial
positions in health. The political cycle forces politicians and consequently managers in health, to set short-
term goals. They have a low δ because they put a lot of weight in the profits earned during the legislature.
In contrast, doctors are career professionals who have long- term goals in health provision. As a result,
politicians usually prefer to implement control and command policies and monetary incentives rather than
implementing motivational incentives or investing in motivational capital (both of which are initially costly).
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Now let us compare the total surplus of each strategy s0 ∈ {0, S} of P, to determine which cases are
the members of the health organisation, taken as a whole, better off. What we summarise in the following
proposition is that the social optimum coincides with the optimal choice of P. This is the case despite
the crowding effects of incentive policies, because incentive compatibility constraint (2) and participation
constraint (3) assume that for every choice s0 ∈ {0, S} of P, and for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T the expected
utility required by A to exert high effort is the same.
Therefore, in line with the first result established in Proposition 1, we have the following:
Proposition 2. Let CNV mk = TSS − TS0 = ∑Tt=0 δt [EC0t − ECSt ]. Let (s0, et) be the strategy profile
that solves the game.
i. If CNV mk > 0, then (S, e) is a Pareto-Efficient strategy profile and Pareto-Dominates (0, e). There-
fore investing in Motivational Capital, s0 = S, is the optimal social choice.
ii. If CNV mk < 0, then (0, e) is a Pareto Efficient strategy profile and Pareto Dominates (S, e). Therefore
not investing in Motivational Capital, s0 = 0 is the optimal social choice.
Risk Aversion and Motivational Capital
In the model, agents are risk-averse and thereby receive contingent rewards linked to performance qt.
Because A is more intrinsically motivated, fewer incentives and less variation in terms of rewards are
required in order to encourage him to exert high effort. Less variation in payments indicates that A can
be compensated with a lower risk premium, and this constitutes another cost-saving source for the health
organisation.
Proposition 3 formally states that investing in motivational capital is more profitable in the presence of
risk-averse A:
Proposition 3. Let A1 and A2 be a pair of agents with φ1 and φ2 intrinsic motivation respectively. If the
agents are risk-averse and φ1 < φ2, then the risk premium will be lower in the case of A2 than in the case
of A1. This additional advantage in costs shortens t∗.
The intuition behind this result is that incentives must be greater in ordert to encourage high effort from
agents without much intrinsic motivation. However, these higher incentives raise the range between the low
w and the high w payments. Given that A is risk averse, the risk premium that P should offer to make
the incentive contract attractive for A will be higher. Analogously, intrinsically motivated agents rerquired
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fewer incentives to exert high effort. Consequently, she has to bear a lower variance over payments and has
to be compensated with a lower risk premium.
4 Conclusion
The following conclusions summarize the results of this work.
First, when the principal is able to encourage doctors’ intrinsic motivation, the length of the game plays
a key role. Proposition 1 shows that investing in motivational capital, although costly at inception, will
be more efficient than the use of monetary incentives in the long run. However, if health care managers
are focused on the short run (legislative period), then they will have a tendency to choose purely monetary
rewards.
Second, the optimal choice of incentives for the principal always coincide with a Pareto-Efficient and
Pareto-Dominant outcome.
Third, when doctors are risk-averse, they accept lower expected payments as their intrinsic motivation
increases. Thus, risk aversion makes it more profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational
capital.
Finally, other parameters of the model such as time preference or managers’ ability to affect doctors
intrinsic motivation are also relevant in determining when a motivational incentive scheme is the optimal
choice.
A Mathematical Appendix
Stochastic Dominance
Crowding effects move the distribution of doctors intrinsic motivation with a stochastic dominance.
Ft(φt = φ∗|wt, 0) > Ft−1(φt−1 = φ∗|wt−1, 0) > · · · > F0(φ0)
> · · · > Ft−1(φt−1 = φ∗|wt−1, S) > Ft(φt = φ∗|wt, S)
Assume that Ft(φ1|wt, S) converges to the upper bound of intrinsic motivation φt = Φ and that Ft(φ1|wt, 0)
converges to the lower bound of intrinsic motivation φt = 0.
lim
t→∞Ft(φt|wt, S) = ρ in which ρ =
{
1 if φt = Φ
0 otherwise
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and
lim
t→∞Ft(φt|wt, 0) = 1, for every φt ∈ [0,Φ].
Let Et[φ|s0, wt] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of φt given the incentive policy s0 and
incentives wt. Consequently, stochastic dominance on Et[φt|·] assumes:
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, 0] < Et[φt|wt, 0]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, S] > Et[φt|wt, S]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[φt|wt, 0] < Et[φt|wt, S]
In which:
Et[φt|s0] =
∫ Φ
0
φtf(φt|wt, s0)dφt
Proof of Proposition 1
We have to study the sign of the following expression:
ΠS −Π0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1(w0t − wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t − wSt )
]− T∑
t=0
δtCt(S) =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
ECF 0t − ECFSt
]
We have to show that there is a given threshold t∗ ∈ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . such that,
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1(w0t − wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t − wSt )
]
=
T∑
t=0
δtCt(S)
By crowding effects we have that ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . }
Et[φt|wt, S] < Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, S] (22)
Et[φt|wt, 0] > Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, 0] (23)
Taking the expected payments (13) and (14), it can be shown immediately that for any incentive policy
of P s0 ∈ {0, S}, both payments (the low ws0 and the high ws0) depend negatively upon the amount of
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intrinsic motivation (φ).
∂w(Et[φt|s0, wt])/∂φ < 0 (24)
∂w(Et[φt|s0, wt])/∂φ < 0. (25)
It immediately follows that the expected cost function, independently of P’s choice over s0 ∈ {0, S}, also
depends negatively upon intrinsic motivation:
∂ECt/∂φ < 0.
(22) and (23) together with (24) and (25), establish that:
wSt (Et[φt|wt, S]) > wSt+1(Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, S])
wSt (Et[φt|wt, S]) > wSt+1(Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, S])
w0t (Et[φt|wt, 0]) < w0t+1(Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, 0])
w0t (Et[φt|wt, 0]) < w0t+1(Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, 0])
Therefore, looking at the expected costs of incentivising effort in each case s0 ∈ {0, S}:
ECSt = θ1w
S
t (Et[φt|wt, S]) + (1− θ1)wSt (Et[φt|wt, S])
EC0t = θ1w
0
t (Et[φt|wt, 0]) + (1− θ1)w0t (Et[φt|wt, 0])
It is immediately shown that the expected cost of incentivising effort is decreasing with time whenever the
choice of P is s0 = S and that the expected cost of incentivising effort is increasing with time whenever the
choice of P is s0 = 0. Formally,
∆ECS = ECSt+1 − ECSt < 0 and ∆EC0 = EC0t+1 − EC0t > 0 (26)
for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T, . . . }.
Now if we calculate ϕt, the period-by-period saved cost for P as a result of his choice of the s0 = S incentive
scheme, we see that these savings are positive and increase over time: Let ϕt = EC0t − ECSt the cost that
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is saved in t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . T, . . . } by P as a result of his choice of s0 = S. ϕt together with (26) give:
∆ϕ = ϕt+1 − ϕt = ∆EC0 −∆ECS = [EC0t+1 − EC0t︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]−[
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ECSt+1 − ECSt ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
These time increasing positive savings of choosing s0 = S ensures that for some tˆ ∈ t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . .
savings will be such that:
ϕtˆ = EC
0
tˆ
− ECS
tˆ
= γS = Ctˆ(S)
This result indicates that there is a given time period tˆ ∈ t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . in which the amount of
resources saved by P in incentivising A’s effort is greater than the depreciation cost of the initial investment
in intrinsic motivation undertaken by P. Equation (26) also ensures that once the game goes beyond tˆ
periods, for every t > tˆ we will have that:
ϕtˆ = EC
0
tˆ
− ECS
tˆ
> γS = Ctˆ(S)
Therefore, beyond the tˆ period, P will get a positive return from making the decision to invest in
motivational capital s0 = S at t = 0. Thus, we have limited losses from t = 0 to t = tˆ, and unlimited
positive returns from t = tˆ to t = ∞. Let us denote the total limited loss of a s0 = S strategy as L. The
following expression then allows us to calculate the present value of this loss:
L =
tˆ∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1(w0t − wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t − wSt )
]− tˆ∑
t=0
δtCt(S) < 0 (27)
Now let us note the total positive returns of a s0 = S strategy as B. The following expression then allows
us to calculate the current value of this return, depending upon the number of times that the game will be
played,
B =
∞∑
t=tˆ
δt
[
θ1(w0t − wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t − wSt )
]− ∞∑
t=tˆ
δtCt(S) > 0 (28)
With a time horizon of infinite number of periods, (40) and (41) jointly assume that there is a threshold
t∗ ∈ {tˆ, . . . , T, . . . } such that L = B holds and this result proves Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate by comparing (28) and (34), and using Proposition 1. Proof available from the authors upon
request.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Immediate by concavity on A’s utility from rewards and the lower variation in incentive payments when
intrinsic motivation is higher. Proof available from the authors upon request.
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